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Abstract
According to traditional literature, liquidity risk in individual banks
can turn into a system-wide ¯nancial crisis when either interbank
credit exposures or bank runs are present. This paper shows that
this phenomenon can also arise when individual liquidity risk trans-
forms into system-wide market risk (even in the absence of bank runs
and interbank credit networks). This happens when banks try to sell
some portion of its assets in order to overcome a liquidity shortage
(individual liquidity risk). These sales depress the market price of
assets if demand is not perfectly elastic. Given the fact that banks
mark to market the asset book, the fall of market price reduces the
value of assets of every bank in the system (system-wide market risk),
leaving them less suited for future liquidity shortages and therefore
more prone to bankruptcies. The paper rationalizes this idea through
the simulation of a model that tries to capture the behavior of a liq-
uidity manager that faces shocks on bank deposits and loans. The
main results suggest that the extent of ¯nancial contagion depends
crucially on the size of the market for assets.
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There is a wide agreement, especially after the recent experience of a num-
ber of countries, that ¯nancial crises entail huge costs. As a consequence,
¯nancial stability has become an important concern for economic authori-
ties. Central banks, responsible for the maintenance of a well-functioning
payments system, now undertake several activities in order to promote ¯-
nancial stability.
According to Large [2005a], one of those activities should be the "as-
sessment of threats to ¯nancial stability", which comprises particularly the
monitoring of the risks faced by ¯nancial institutions. A correct monitoring
depends crucially on the "stock of knowledge" about how risks arise and op-
erate in individual ¯nancial institutions. And perhaps more relevant, about
how risks faced by individual institutions turn into systemic risk, and even-
tually become material in the form of a system-wide ¯nancial crisis1.
This paper is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the me-
chanics of liquidity risk and, particularly, of the underlying forces that allow
liquidity crises in individual ¯nancial institutions to spread throughout the
¯nancial system in a contagion-fashion2. Speci¯cally, the objective of this pa-
per is to explore the possibility that liquidity risk faced by individual banks
turn into systemic risk through its relationship with market risk: as will be
shown, the sales of assets that banks conduct in order to overcome a liquid-
ity shortage (individual liquidity risk) disturb the market for assets of every
bank in the system(system-wide market risk), possibly leading to a ¯nancial
crisis3. This source of systemic risk has been relatively left aside by recent
literature.
The paper rationalizes this idea through the simulation of a model that
tries to capture the behavior of a liquidity manager that faces shocks on bank
deposits and loans. The main results suggest that the extent of ¯nancial
contagion depends crucially on the size of the market for assets, which is
related particularly to the aggregate demand of credit in the economy.
The paper unfolds in four sections. The ¯rst section reviews some of the
relevant literature, in order to locate the contribution of this paper. The
second section focuses on the above-mentioned model, while the third and
1For a concrete de¯nition of systemic risk, see De Bandt and Hartmann [2000].
2Liquidity risk is related to the possibility of a bank being unable to pay its liabilities
as they fall due, independently of its solvency situation. This "institutional liquidity risk"
(Large[2005b]) -as shows this paper- relates itself to the inability to liquidate positions "in
a timely manner and at a reasonable prices" (Muranaga and Ohsawa[1997]).
3Market risk is associated to the losses su®ered by ¯nancial institutions in the possible
event of a disruption in the general conditions of the markets in which banks concur.
2the fourth will present, respectively, the results of the simulations of the
model and some re°ections that serve as concluding comments.
2 A tale of the literature
The appearance of systemic risk in a ¯nancial system, arising from liquidity
risk in individual ¯nancial institutions, is probably a phenomenon as old as
banks themselves4.
Following Gorton[1988] and Fur¯ne[1999], the recent literature on the
topic can be classi¯ed in three groups. It is worth noting, however, that
this classi¯cation is in some sense arbitrary and that these three groups
are not necessarily mutually excluding. Its only usefulness is to locate in a
straightforward manner the contribution of this paper.
The ¯rst group considers that systemic risk is a natural result of the
possibility of bank runs. The pioneering work by Diamond and Dybvig[1983]
emphasizes the role of the liquidity structure of banks in inducing runs5. In
particular, the raison d'^ etre of banks is characterized by the transformation of
liquid liabilities into illiquid assets. The model exhibits multiple equilibria:
besides showing how the presence of banks can improve on private (non-
bank)market allocation, one of these equilibria is characterized by a bank
run, in which depositors simultaneously rush to withdraw their deposits6.
The common thread of the story is that banks face shocks on deposits that
can be backed only by a portfolio of illiquid assets, redeemable only with
discount (i.e.: banks face liquidity risk)7.
Gorton[1988] denies the idea that sunspots are behind bank runs. In-
stead, he shows that bank runs can be understood as the rational response
of depositors whose perceptions of aggregate risk are altered. One source of
alteration of these perceptions is the business cycle. His theoretical model,
however, lacks an explicit modelling of the liquidity structure of the balance
sheet of banks, which is so crucial in the model of Diamond and Dybvig8.
4The materialization of systemic risk into ¯nancial crises is also an old issue. See
Kindleberger[1978] for an interpretation of the history of the most important ¯nancial
crises.
5Only one bank is modelled in the framework of Diamond and Dybvig[1983]
6The selection between the bank run equilibrium and other equilibria is not a clear issue.
According to Diamond and Dybvig, the bank run may appear as a result of the release of
some sort of negative information, or "even sunspots" (Diamond and Dybvig[1983]). This
is a very criticized feature of the model.
7The discount is exogenous.
8The empirical record of bank runs has been analyzed, among others, by Gorton[1988]
and Hasan and Dwyer[1994].
3An ample majority of recent researchers can be grouped into the second
strand of the literature. According to them, individual liquidity risk becomes
systemic risk whenever "the failure of one or a small number of institutions
[is] transmitted to others due to explicit ¯nancial linkages across institutions"
(Fur¯ne[1999], italics added), even if bank runs are not present. These ¯-
nancial linkages are commonly associated to interbank credit exposures. In
most papers, banks are subject to a common source of uncertainty (e.g. de-
mand for liquidity from depositors). Shocks then hit one or some banks.
Eventually, these banks will default on their payments in interbank credit
market, leaving creditors (other banks) in a hard ¯nancial situation. Again
eventually, these creditors will default on its liabilities to other banks, and so
on. Financial trouble spreads from one bank to another in a domino-fashion.
The work by Allen and Gale[2000] is representative of this group. In
their model, banks are uncertain about their individual demand for liquidity
from depositors (and therefore subject to liquidity risk). According to these
authors, a complete interbank market allows optimal risk sharing between
depositors and banks and between banks themselves. An incomplete inter-
bank market, instead, is prone -under certain states of nature- to contagion
of bankruptcy from banks with unusually high demand of liquidity to other
banks, through credit expositions in the interbank market. In much as the
same way as Diamond and Dybvig, Allen and Gale give a crucial role to the
liquidity structure of the banks balance sheet9.
To Rochet and Tirole[1996], the de¯nition of systemic risk is limited to
only the "propagation of an agent's economic distress to other agents linked
to that agent through ¯nancial transactions". These authors build a model
of interbank lending, where under certain conditions contagion is an issue.
Furthermore, they explore how the presence of contagion-prone interbank
exposures may bene¯t from interbank monitoring, enhancing the results ob-
tained with a centralized scheme of credit insurance or liquidity management.
The coordinating role of a centralized authority (central bank) in presence
of interbank linkages is also analyzed by Freixas, Parigi and Rochet[2000].
These authors coincide with Allen and Gale in stating that the absence of
an interbank credit market reduces the capability of the banking system to
face an uncertain demand for liquidity from depositors. Interbank credit net-
works, however, bring the possibility of contagion and rationalize an orderly
(in terms of liquidating insolvent banks) intervention by the central bank.
The contribution of an interbank credit market to liquidity risk manage-
ment of a ¯nancial system is analyzed, in the context of the simulation of mi-
9Reformulations of the original model by Castiglionesi[2004], in order to allow an active
role by the central bank, reach similar conclusions.
4croeconomic models, by Iori and Jafarey[2000], Iori, Jafarey and Padilla[2003]
and Estrada[2001]. Liquidity risk arises in these models because banks are
subject to deposit as well as investment shocks, that make liquidity short-
ages likely. Banks are allowed to overcome shortages by borrowing in the
interbank market. As the abovementioned literature suggests, the interbank
market is subject to a trade-o®: it improves the resilience of the system in
comparison with a situation in which there is no interbank transactions, but
makes the system prone to contagion of ¯nancial trouble from one bank to
another. Importantly, these authors suggest that rather than empirical ex-
ercises, simulation of microeconomic models is a natural strategy to analyze
these issues, given data limitations on bilateral interbank credit exposures10.
Finally, the third group of literature remains relatively underdeveloped.
This strand emphasizes the disruption of ¯nancial markets that can be pro-
voked by a troubled bank. Insofar as this disruption alters the value of the
positions of every bank in the system, it is possible to state that the dis-
tress of the former bank spreads to other banks through the disruption of
the market. As individual risks end up disturbing markets, it is possible to
state that, according to this group, individual risks turn into market risk.
The work by Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin[2005], Schnabel and Shin[2004]
and Plantin, Sapra and Shin[2005] can be grouped into this strand11.
In the models by Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin[2005] and Schnabel and
Shin[2004], a distressed bank resorts to the sale of illiquid assets in order to
avoid default on its interbank liabilities. This unambiguosly depresses the
price of the assets (disturbs the market), and consequently the value of the
portfolio of every bank in the system (in presence of mark-to-market rules).
If price falls enough, the bank will default, leaving other banks in a distress
similar to the one su®ered by the initial bank.
This strand of literature, however, imposes several restrictions on the
mechanisms that allow individual risks turning into market risk. These mod-
els, for example, do not include explicitly shocks on the demand for liquidity,
and hence neglect the role of the source of liquidity risk in previous literature.
Instead, the initial distress comes from the exogenous default of any bank
in the system. Furthermore, in the case of the model by Cifuentes, Ferrucci
and Shin[2005], banks are obliged to comply with an exogenous capital ade-
cuacy ratio. By this mechanism, further sales of illiquid assets are feeded by
10An obliged reference on the empirical relevance of contagion from interbank credit
exposures is Fur¯ne[1999]. For an application of physics network theory to an interbank
market, see Boss, Elsinger, Summer and Thurner[2005].
11These studies follow previous ideas by Allen and Gale[2003] and Diamond and Ra-
jan[2003].
5previous sales, exacerbating the disruption of the market12.
This paper belongs to the third strand of literature. The model to be
presented later tries to emphasize the idea that liquidity risk can distress
banks, and distressed banks can perturb the markets in which all banks
concur. This perturbation a®ects the capability of other banks to withstand
liquidity shocks13. In doing so, however, the model overcomes the °aws
mentioned in the last paragraph by relying in some of the insights provided
by the ¯rst and second strands. In particular, the model will explicitly include
an uncertain demand for liquidity from depositors, as most models of the ¯rst
and second group do, in the context of the simulation of a microeconomic
model, as some of the second strand does.
Furthermore, the model shows that the appearance of market risk and
¯nancial contagion does not depend upon either the presence of interbank
credit exposures, bank runs or regulatory capital requirements. A contribu-
tion of the model is to show that the perturbation of markets by distressed
banks is an issue even if those elements are not present.
3 The Framework
3.1 A note on microfoundations
In this section, the intraday problem of the liquidity manager of a represen-
tative bank is modelled. The liquidity manager is not only in charge of the
handling of the liquid resources of the bank, but also of the transactions that
banks conduct in the market. The handling of liquidity and the participation
in the market lie at the heart of the model.
The problem that faces a bank as a whole is associated, traditionally,
to the maximization of an objective function (e.g. pro¯ts, market share) in
presence of resource as well as technological constraints14.
In this model, however, the intraday problem of the liquidity manager has
nothing to do with optimization. The absence of an optimization problem is
justi¯ed on two grounds.
First, the problem that faces the liquidity manager is not necessarily the
same problem that faces the bank as a whole. Rather than to maximize
something, the only objective of the liquidity manager is to pay intraday lia-
12In a sense, the source of perturbation is exogenous.
13To the extent that the actions of a distressed bank end up altering the ¯nancial
resilience of other banks, the model captures ¯nancial contagion (in the sense of De Bandt
and Hartmann[2000]).
14See Freixas and Rochet [1997]
6bilities, subject to aggregate liquidity, and the sizes of the income statement
and the balance sheet of the bank; independent of the e®ect that the cor-
responding actions have on the non-modelled objective function of the bank
as a whole. When the manager is not able to accomplish that objective, the
bank goes bankrupt and disappears from the ¯nancial system.
Second, the model considers the e®ect of the disappearance of bankrupt
banks. General equilibrium models such as those by Goodhart, Tsunirand
and Tsomocos[2004a,2004b,2005] and Tsomocos[2003], do not take into ac-
count the possibility of forced liquidation of banks as the response to ¯nancial
trouble. Rather, banks exhibit in equilibrium a probability of default, and
they either only consider to be liquidated as a consequence of the end of the
world (in the two-period version of the model) or simply do not consider it
at all (in the in¯nite-horizon version).
This model is instead based on the belief that the disappearance of
bankrupt banks a®ects other banks through several mechanisms, in partic-
ular through its e®ect on competition and aggregate liquidity. So, as will
be shown, the liquidation of banks is crucial in the understanding of how
systemic risk arise.
3.2 The model
The model presented in this subsection follows previous work by Iori and
Jafarey[2000] and Estrada[2001].
This exercise seeks to model the day-to-day problem faced by the liquidity
manager of a bank, in a context where the bank faces deposit as well as loans
shocks, that make liquidity shortages likely. Under a shortage, the liquidity
manager is obliged to seek for liquid funds in order to pay the liabilities of
the bank. For Iori and Jafarey[2000] and Estrada[2001], banks can obtain
these funds by borrowing in an interbank market for loans.
As said before, the objective of this paper is to show the possible existence
of ¯nancial contagion in the absence of exposures in the interbank market for
loans. Therefore, in sharp contrast with these papers, the interbank market
for loans is not present in this model, so liquidity managers cannot solve
liquidity problems borrowing in it. Instead, this model assumes that banks
are endowed with a stock of assets (as government debt securities) that can
be traded with other banks in an interbank market for assets, and whose
(asset) value (as in Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin[2005])is marked-to-market.
When a liquidity manager ¯nds himself in a liquidity shortage, the prob-
lem can be solved by selling to other banks a portion of its tradeable asset.
As asset demand is not perfectly elastic, the sales will lead to a fall in asset
prices. By the mark-to-market valuation procedure, the assets of other banks
7will lose value correspondingly, which leaves other banks in a weaker position
to face future liquidity shocks. In this model, then, ¯nancial contagion is the
result of the depression of asset prices triggered by liquidity shocks in an
individual bank.
3.2.1 The appearance of liquidity risk
Suppose that, at any point in time, the ¯nancial system is composed by a
¯nite number of operating banks, Nt. Each bank is labelled by the superscript
k, where k 2 f1;2;:::;Ntg. This model does not allow for replacement of
bankrupt banks.
At the start of period t, the liquidity manager of bank k inherits an












t¡1: Cash holdings inherited from period t ¡ 1.
Dk
t¡1: Deposits held by the public in bank k at the end of t ¡ 1.
¯: Reserve requirement on deposits set by the central bank15.
Lk
t¡1: Stock of loans extended by bank k until the end of t ¡ 1.
Ak
t¡1: Stock of tradeable asset of bank k at the end of t ¡ 1.
pt¡1: Unitary market price of tradeable asset at the end of t ¡ 116.
According to expression (3.1), the cash holdings of bank k at the begin-
ning of t corresponds to after-¯ deposits minus the total operations in which
bank k has engaged. Note that the only balance sheet item that is valued
at market prices is the stock of tradeable asset. This fact implicitly assumes
that the set of remaining items have a constant price of 1.
At the beginning of t, the bank simultaneously receives payments from
loans, must pay interest on deposits, and faces shocks in its stock of deposits.
The model also assumes that the tradeable asset produces income to its
holder.
Loans must be repaid after two periods. Therefore, the payment from





15The central bank is modelled as a strategic dummy whose tasks are to set the reserve
requirement and to oversee the liquidation of bankrupt banks. This model does not take
into account any scheme of ¯nancial regulation in terms of capital requirements. As was
mentioned, the objective of this exercise is to show the possibility of ¯nancial contagion
in the absence of capital requirements forcing the balance sheet of banks.
16Because of mark-to-market rules, market price equals asset book value.
8where ½l is the one-period interest rate that banks charge on loans. Note
that this expression implies that borrowers do not pay interest income one
period after the loan was extended.
The interest rate payed on deposits is determined endogenously according
to the model of Salop[1979] in the following way17:




This speci¯cation attempts to capture the e®ect of competition on de-
posits rate. When the ¯nancial system is large(Nt is large), the deposit rate
will tend to ½l and the margin will tend to zero. The reduction in the num-
ber of banks caused by bankruptcies will move the deposits rate downwards
and will consequently increase the markup. Finally, interests are paid on the
stock of deposits observed at the end of t ¡ 1.
The interest proceeds from the holding of the tradeable asset are ex-
ogenous. To simplify, this model assumes that the tradeable asset has no
maturity, so the proceeds from holding it correspond only to the stock of
the asset multiplied by an exogenous and constant interest rate, ½a. For rea-
sons that will become clear later, the only restriction on the value of ½a is
½a · ½l
18.
The gap in the timing between the payments from loans and the pay-
ments to depositors is precisely a source of liquidity risk in this framework.
If the e®ect of other balance sheet items is isolated, banks are prone to liq-
uidity shortages because they have not still received income from loans at
the moment when the must pay to depositors19.
The other source of liquidity risk in this model is the stochastic pattern
of withdrawals and creation of deposits. Given that the behavior of deposits
is unpredictable, a liquidity manager can ¯nd itself unable to pay depositors
due to the illiquidity of its investments.
This model assumes that aggregate deposits are exogenously determin-
istic, and are divided in two portions that are distributed among banks.
The ¯rst portion is the deterministic component of aggregate deposits that
is distributed prorrata among banks. The second portion is the stochastic
component of aggregate deposits, and is distributed randomly among banks.
The decomposition of aggregate deposits into a deterministic and a stochas-
17See Freixas and Rochet[1998] for a detailed analysis of the model of Salop.
18This restriction is not very unrealistic, insofar as the risk associated to tradeable assets
(like government debt securities) is usually smaller than that associated to loans.
19The gap between the maturity of assets and the maturity of liabilities, that traces back
to Diamond and Dybvig, is precisely used as a measure of liquidity risk by, for example,
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) of the International Monetary Fund.













¼: The autorregressive component of deposits of bank k.
¾d: The stochastic share of aggregate deposits. As can be seen, ¾d 2 [0;1].
This means that the stochastic share is an exogenous percentage of aggregate
deposits.
"k
t : The share of the stochastic component of aggregate deposits that
goes to bank k at the start of period t. Bank deposits are random because "k
t
is random. "k




The uniformity of "k
t implies that any individual bank face the same
conditions than its competitors, unless the initial size of banks di®ers. This
is indicative of the competitive environment in which banks act20.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that eq. (3.4) does not allow the
possibility of bank runs. In accordance with (3.4), depositors shift deposits
from one bank to another in a random way, not as a rational response to
their forecast about the ¯nancial soundness of the bank. Moreover, aggregate
deposits are not a®ected by the behavior of depositors. This fact implicitly
assumes that depositors do not withdraw resources from the ¯nancial system
as a whole, as is the case with a bank run.
3.2.2 Liquidity shortages
After interest income from assets is received, interest are paid and shocks on
deposits are faced, the liquidity manager of an individual bank ¯nds himself
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Eq.(3.6) corresponds to the liquid resources of the bank during period
t: the sum of intraperiod position in cash (d Mk
t ) and deposits in the central
bank in the form of reserve requirements (¯Dk
t).
20The behavior of individual bank deposits may be justi¯ed on the grounds of depositors
that move randomly across geographic regions that are associated with a speci¯c bank.
10Liquidity risk materializes in the form of a liquidity shortage when the
liquid resources during period t are negative, i.e., when d Mk
t +¯Dk
t < 0. It is















Eq.(3.7) states that the bank is unable to pay his/her obligations to de-
positors, because of the illiquidity of its assets. On the contrary, when a
bank has positive liquid resources, it has resources in excess of its obligations
to depositors, which may be referred to as "liquidity excess". The liquidity
excess is available for investment in loans or tradable assets.
3.2.3 The interbank market for tradeable assets
In the absence of an interbank market, a liquidity shortage would imply the
liquidation of the bank21. Notwithstanding, before liquidation, the liquidity
manager can try to solve his/her liquidity problem by selling a portion of
his/her stock of the tradeable asset. The stock of the tradeable asset that
needs to be sold by bank k during period t, sk
t, is therefore equivalent to
its liquidity shortage (of course, sk










Note that the bank calculates the necessary sales with the market price
of assets observed at the end of t ¡ 1, i.e., before the market for tradeable
assets open.
Tradeable assets can be sold only to other banks (and as will be showed
later, to the central bank only in case of liquidation of the bank). This means
that the potential purchasers of tradeable assets are banks with liquidity ex-
cesses. However, banks with liquidity excesses give priority to extend loans,
which is granted by making the interest rate on loans greater than the in-
terest rate on tradeable assets. The loans a bank with liquidity excess can
extend behave stochastically in a similar way as individual bank deposits. In
particular, the opportunity for bank k in period t to extend loans is22:
o
k






21In this model, the central bank is not allowed to o®er liquidity assistance to solvent
banks. Therefore, the "Lender of Last Resort" role for the central bank is not present.
22The "opportunity" refers to the share of total aggregate demand for loans that goes
to bank k. It is called the "opportunity" because, as will be shown, the bank will not
necessarily satisfy that share.
11where:
­: Aggregate demand for loans, assumed constant.
¾o :The stochastic component of aggregate demand for loans . As can
be seen, ¾o 2 [0;1]. This means that the stochastic portion is an exogenous
percentage of aggregate demand.
ºk
t :The share of the stochastic component of demand that goes to bank k
during period t.
The opportunity to extend loans extended in period t is constrained, of
course, by the liquidity excess (net of the reserve requirement) of the bank.
In other words, if ok
t is greater than the liquidity excess (net), the actual
amount of loans extended must be equivalent to the liquidity excess (net).
That amount therefore corresponds to:
w
k




Note that according to (3.10), banks with liquidity shortages do not ex-
tend loans.
If after extending loans, the bank is still left with liquid resources, this
excess is spent by the bank purchasing tradeable assets to banks with a










From (3.11) note that the greater wk
t (i.e. the greater the opportunity to
extend loans), the smaller bk
t and hence the smaller the demand for tradeable
assets (the smaller the market of the tradeable asset). Finally, the working
of the market for the tradeable asset is given by the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 3.1. Market for tradeable asset. The market for tradeable asset
is a double(Xt,pt) consisting of a matrix of transactions of tradeable assets,
Xt, whose dimensions are N0 X N0 and a new price for the tradeable asset





t] 8 i;j 2 [1;:::;Nt] (1) PNt
















t) · 1 (4)
.
Item(1) de¯nes the elements of X. The element (i;j) of X corresponds
to a transaction conducted in the market by a seller bank (i) and a purchaser
12bank (j). Item(2) states that total sales by bank i may be smaller than its
liquidity shortage (never greater, bank i cannot short sell the tradeable asset).
In this sense, the market will not necessarily clear. According to item(3), no
agreed transaction can be greater than total demand. Item(4) determines the
evolution of the market price of the tradeable asset as a negative function of
the excess supply in the market, where ¸ is a positive constant that represents
the sensitivity of pt to the excess supply. This price is not intended to clear
the market, but to capture the idea that even if the market does not clear,
a greater excess supply depress unambiguously the price. Finally, pt is the
price at which all transactions in the interbank market for the tradeable asset
are conducted.
As far as the simulation is concerned, the code starts by taking a bank
facing a liquidity shortage, making sure that the shortage satis¯es two condi-
tions: ¯rst, it can be satis¯ed with the liquidity excesses of the other banks.
Second, the sale of its total stock of tradeable assets is at least enough to
cover the shortage23 . If both conditions are satis¯ed, the market opens:
this bank contacts any other bank in a random order. If the latter faces a
liquidity excess, a transaction between the two banks is agreed according to
item(1). The transaction is agreed at price pt. If the former bank does not
cover the shortage with this transaction, then it contacts any other bank,
until the shortage is covered. The code takes then another shortage bank,
and so on. The code stops when there are no more liquidity excesses to buy
tradeable assets (the market closes). From that moment, it is clear that some
banks with liquidity shortage will not be able to cover it.
3.2.4 End of period t and the channel of contagion
At the end of period t, after the closure of the market for tradeable asset, all
banks left with liquidity shortages are liquidated(i.e. are bankrupt). As was
mentioned, a bank is bankrupt if the market closed before it could agree any
transaction, or if its stock of assets was not enough to cover its shortage.
The central bank oversees the liquidation of every bankruptcy. In partic-
ular, the central bank distributes the liquidation value of the bankrupt bank
among its depositors who, in turn, redeposit these resources in the remaining
banks24. The liquidation value is the sum of the intraperiod position and a
fraction ° of its assets (loans and tradeable assets), minus total liabilities
23If the shortage do not satisfy any of these conditions, the bank is liquidated according
to the procedure that will be presented later
24These resources add up to aggregate deposits, that will be distributed among banks
according to (3.4).
13(deposits)25. Whenever the liquidation value falls short of of the obligations
of the bank, aggregate deposits are reduced by the di®erence.
The evolution of total deposits will then be given by:












Note that the sum correspond to those banks that fall bankrupt(B). Ac-












t is valued at price pt. So, even if the bank has not engaged
in transactions of tradeable asset, the new stock of the tradeable asset is
valued at the new market price according to the mark-to-market valuation
procedure. This is precisely the channel of ¯nancial contagion emphasized
in this model: the fall in the value of assets caused by the shortages of some
banks (as the supply of tradeable assets exceeds demand)has an important
e®ect on other banks: it leaves them less well-suited for future liquidity
needs, insofar as the bu®er to face liquidity shortages lose value. The model
shows, then, how liquidity risk can turn into market risk for banks, and how
the interaction between market and liquidity risk can spread between banks
causing ¯nancial crises, which is understood here as a large number of almost
simultaneous bankruptcies.
The next section will try to understand in more detail, by means of sim-
ulations of the previous model, this "mechanics" of the interaction between
liquidity and market risk.
4 Simulations
This section focuses on the results of several simulations of the above model.
All simulations share two features in common. First, to the end of compa-
rability, all of them used 10 starting banks (N0 = 10) and 150 iterations
(periods of time), with the exception of the simulation of the Colombian
banking system. Second, to the end of exacerbating liquidity risk, starting
banks are divided arbitrarily in two groups: the ¯rst group does receive inter-
est proceeds from loans in t = 0 and does not in t = 1(i.e. they did extended
loans in t = ¡2 and did not in t = ¡1), while the second group does not
receive interest proceeds from loans in t = 0 and does in t = 1(i.e. they did
not extended loans in t = ¡2 and did in t = ¡1).
251-° can be understood as the cost of liquidation procedures.
14Additionally, because of the random features of the simulations and the
consequent caveats about robustness, each one of them (i.e. 150 iterations
for 10 starting banks under a given set of parameters) was run 1000 times.
The results showed below correspond therefore to an average of those 1000
exercises.
The ¯rst set of simulations were performed under the assumption of ho-
mogeneous starting banks26. This assumption is removed in the second and
third set of simulations. Second set imposes randomly heterogeneous starting
banks, as in Iori, Jafarey and Padilla[2003], while third set explores the ef-
fect that the model dynamics has on a system whose balance sheet structure
mirrors that of the Colombian ¯nancial system.
From here on, the number of surviving banks in each moment of time will
be the main measure of ¯nancial resilience27.
4.1 Homogeneous banks
Starting 10 banks are endowed with 1000 units of deposits and tradeable
assets. 1000 units of starting loans are given to the ¯rst group of starting
banks in t = ¡2 and to the second group in t = ¡128.
Figure 1 shows the e®ect of ­ (aggregate demand for credit) on the re-
silience of the system (and therefore on the extent of ¯nancial contagion).
On average, the smaller the demand for credit, the sounder the ¯nancial sys-
tem. When aggregate demand equals 500 (a twentieth of aggregate starting
deposits), an average of 6,4 banks survive the 150 periods of time, after a
huge ¯nancial crisis in early iterations . The number of surviving banks falls
to 4.8, 3.6 and 1.7 when ­ is 1000, 2000 and 3000 respectively.
For levels of ­ of 4000 or 5000, no bank survives the horizon of 150
iterations. In the former case, however, all banks go bankrupt in an average
of 51 iterations, while in the latter it requires only 11 iterations.
These results are interpreted in terms of the e®ect of ­ on the size of the
market for tradeable assets. When the aggregate demand for credit is low
26Besides the properties of "k
t, homogeneity refers to an identical starting balance sheet
27The model is inherently prone to instability. Only under certain sets of parameter
values, a positive number of banks survive the horizon of 150 periods of time. Therefore,
¯nancial resilience can also be captured by the number of periods that are needed to go
bankrupt the whole ¯nancial system.
28The set of parameters employed in these simulations were: ®=0.1, ¯=0.2(when not
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Figure 1: Surviving Banks and Aggregate demand for credit - ho-
mogeneous banks
(high), the opportunity of banks to extend loans falls (rises) in concordance
with (3.9), which at least decreases (increases) the actual amount of loans
extended according to (3.10). If this amount falls (rises), the demand for
tradeable asset (3.11) rises (falls) for banks with liquidity excesses, which in
turn widens (narrows) the market.
Finally, if demand is high(low) the fall in the market price will be less
(more) pronounced (see item (4) in de¯nition 3.1), which inhibits(exacerbates)
the perturbation of the market emphasized in the model. In summary, the
negative e®ect of ­ on the extent of contagion can be understood in the
light of its negative e®ect on the size of the market for tradeable assets, and
therefore, on market price.
Figures 2 and 3 show the e®ect of ¾d(random share of deposits) and
¯(reserve requirement) on the resilience of the system. According to ¯gure
2, a more random pattern of individual deposits (in terms of a greater ¾d)
has not a clear e®ect on resilience. Except in the case with ¾d = 0:1, no
value for ¾d has a similar e®ect. For values of ¾d ranging from 0.3 to 0.9,
a number of banks ranging from 2.3 and 3.1 survives after a ¯nancial crisis
that leaves half of the ¯nancial system in bankruptcy. If the dispersion
of simulations is included, these results are not "statistically" di®erent. The
extent of contagion via market perturbation does not depend therefore clearly
on the volatility of deposits.
The reserve requirement has a negative e®ect on ¯nancial resilience in





25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Si gm ad=0. 1
Si gm ad=0. 3
Si gm ad=0. 5
Si gm ad=0. 7
Si gm ad=0. 9
I t erat i ons
Survi vi ng
Banks












I t erat i ons
Survi vi ng
Banks













I t erat i ons
Survi vi ng
Banks
Figure 4: Surviving Banks and Aggregate demand for credit - het-
erogeneous banks
model assumes that marginal reserve requirement equals total reserve re-
quirement, a higher ¯ makes liquidity shortages more likely according to
(3.1).
4.2 Randomly heterogeneous banks
To induce heterogeneity of banks, each one of the 10 starting banks is en-
dowed with an equal stock of deposits, investment and loans (in t = ¡1 or
t = ¡2), randomly chosen in the interval [0,1000]. To enhance robustness in
face of an additional source of randomness, these simulations were performed
5000 times.
In the case of heterogeneous banks, the dispersion of results is smaller29.
The negative e®ect of ­ on the resilience of the system remains (see Figure
4), although in all simulations all banks went bankrupt in a range of 4 to 16
iterations.
Moreover, as seen in Figure 5, the e®ect of the volatility of deposits
remains unclear, although in this case the abnormal value of ¾d is 0.9 instead
of 0.1.
29The set of parameters employed in these simulations were: ®=0.1, ¯=0.2(when not
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Figure 5: Surviving Banks and Deposit Randomness - heterogeneous
banks
Similar results are obtained with the reserve requirement (Figure 6):
rather than having a clear one-directional e®ect on contagion, the case of
heterogeneous banks do not exhibit a clear e®ect of reserve requirement on
resilience. Di®erences are not, moreover, "statistically" signi¯cant.
4.3 Heterogeneous banks: A simulation of colombian
¯nancial system
On November 2005, 16 banks took place in the Colombian banking system.
This is the only set of simulations with a di®erent number of starting banks.
To mirror the structure of this system, the 1000 units of the homogeneous
case were distributed among the 16 banks according to the participation
that each bank had on November 2005 on the total stock of the respective
balance sheet item. For example, if Bancolombia (the biggest bank in the
system) had 25 percent of deposits on November 2005, the simulations give
to Bancolombia 250 units as starting deposits.
It is important to note that, in this case, the distribution of banks with
loans in t = ¡1 and t = ¡2 alters not only the results of the simulations but
the concept of the incidence of liquidity risk in the ¯nancial system. This
occurs because the distribution imposes a misleading conjecture on the real
exposure to liquidity risk of Colombian banks. This obliges to present the
results under two extreme distributions of banks: ¯rst, assuming that the 8
biggest banks extend loans in t = ¡1; second, assuming that the 8 smallest
banks extend loans in t = ¡130.
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Figure 6: Surviving Banks and Reserve Requirements - heteroge-
neous banks
Figure 7 shows the e®ect of the aggregate demand for credit (­) on the
extent of contagion under the ¯rst distribution of banks31. Yet again, on
average, the demand for credit exerts a negative impact on the resilience of
the simulated Colombian ¯nancial system. In this case, if demand for credit
equals a half of the observed aggregate stock of loans (­ = 500), an average
of 15.94 banks survive the 150 iterations. This number reduces slightly to
15.90 if aggregate demand rises to ­ = 1000. All banks fall bankrupt only
when the demand of credit is more than ten times the observed stock of
loans.
Figure 8 demonstrates the robustness of this result in face of a di®erent
distribution of starting banks. Results are qualitatively similar under the
second distribution of banks.
5 Concluding comments
The materialization of individual liquidity risk into systemic risk and, even-
tually, into a system-wide ¯nancial crisis, is a widely studied issue. It has
been associated, traditionally, to the presence of bank runs and/or ¯nancial
interlinkages in banking systems. The purpose of this paper was to show that
liquidity risk may also end up in systemic risk when troubled banks disturb
31The set of parameters employed in the simulation of the colombian ¯nancial system
were: ®=0.1, ¯=0.06(not variable in this case), ¾d=0.9(estimated, not variable), ¾o = ° =
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Figure 8: Surviving Banks and Aggregate demand for credit -
Colombia
21¯nancial markets. In this sense, individual liquidity risk turns into market
risk, before hitting other banks in a contagion fashion.
This paper showed -by means of the simulation of a microeconomic model-
not only that the aforementioned mechanism works, but that it depends cru-
cially on the depth of the ¯nancial markets in which banks concur. By this
way, this paper contributes to the understanding of the mechanics of liquidity
risk, and does so by relying on some of the most important insights of cur-
rent literature. Indeed, the mechanisms emphasized in this paper have been
relatively left aside in recent works, and when taken into account, severely
restricted. This paper lifted several of those restrictions.
In order to complement these contributions, some additional re°ections
are noteworthy.
The practical usefulness of these results may be questioned on the grounds
that they arise from a very limited theoretical speci¯cation32.
Despite the controlled environment of the microeconomic model, it is pos-
sible to state that these results leave some practical lessons: ¯rstly, the very
simple fact of liquidity risk turning into market risk. In the case of Colombia,
for example, recent statements from the economic authorities point to the
growing relevance of market risk for the stability of the ¯nancial system33.
Market risk is actually considered the most important risk facing the ¯nan-
cial system, and perhaps under a situation of liquidity stress, fears about
market risk may exacerbate.
Moreover, the results point to several variables that -on a pure environment-
need to be monitored closely in order to avoid the exacerbation of market
risk arising from liquidity risk. Among them, the results suggest the need to
monitor the depth of the markets in which banks concur.
Turning to the source of liquidity shocks, the model reinforces the real-life
idea that liquidity in markets is not given. In developing countries, such as
Colombia, liquidity shocks depend crucially, for example, on the behavior of
foreign markets. The model suggests, by this way, that turbulence in foreign
markets (when expressed in volatility of liquidity in the market) can imply
negative e®ects on the value of assets and on the soundness of banks, via
endogenous interactions inside the system.
Also in practical grounds, fears can arise that the mechanisms outlined
32The story told in this paper makes no sense, for example, if the model includes a
central bank ready to inject any needed amount of liquidity at any point in time. It is
possible to argue, however, that any intervention has a limit, insofar as the central bank
cares about in°ation. This story may begin, then, when that limit is reached.
33See, for example the Financial Stability Reports of the Banco de la Rep¶ ublica de
Colombia. Around a third of the assets of the colombian banking system is placed in
tradeable assets, particularly government debt securities.
22above are a by-product of the increasing complexity of current ¯nancial sys-
tems and instruments. The work by Schnabel and Shin [2004] (about the
european ¯nancial crisis of 1763) is there to remember that it is not neces-
sary a huge and complex system of institutions and instruments to see how
liquidity risks transforms into market risk. This is a caveat in favour of the
simplicity of the above framework.
Finally, it is worth to mention a subtle practical lesson emerging from
the mechanics of the model. According to Plantin, Sapra and Shin[2005],
fair accounting in terms of marking the asset book to market (despite its
transparency bene¯ts) poses a threat to ¯nancial stability by accentuating
¯nancial cycles. In the context of the presented model, mark-to-market rules
place the same restrictions on ¯nancial stability.
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